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Abstract
Against liberal pluralist political practice in South Africa
In this article I take issue with liberal pluralist political practice in South 
Africa. Multicultural civil society requires the recognition o f  cultural 
categories which modernity, in the shape o f liberal pluralism, cannot 
accommodate and therefore ignore in the interests o f  fostering a single 
monocultural politics. In South Africa this trend has taken the usual route 
o f difference-blind, assimilationisl political programmes aimed at nation 
building (under the slogan “one people -  one nation"). I attempt to show 
that liberal pluralist practice can be adapted to make space fo r  cultural and 
ethnic categories, and that a nation o f a common political identity can be 
constructed out o f this adaptation, but that a re-interpretaiion o f  liberal 
notions o f  liberty and equality is required.
1. Stating the problem
The political process in South Africa today is dominated by liberal pluralist 
thinking. South African liberal pluralism, however, assumes Euro-American 
value terms and working conditions which, as liberal procedures standardly do, 
tend to screen out the diversity o f cultural viewpoints and conflicts, thus 
prejudicing the South African political culture to a politics o f difference, the very 
thing which a multicultural reality seeks to affirm. It is a striking irony that the 
categories o f difference (and identity) which the apartheid era had so prejudicially 
affirmed in favour of whites, particularly with respect to citizenship (and, by 
implication, negated for blacks) once again disappears under the weight of 
political expediency. This is a different form o f what, during the apartheid era, 
might have been called an “uneven deployment o f identity politics” (Goldberg, 
1994:110). A number of identity struggles arising from notions o f difference are 
challenging the established norms o f liberalism’s attempt to foster a single 
political culture. This challenge is really about unrecognized assumptions in the 
liberal programme about how a multicultural civil society operates, a reminder 
that the discursive space within which a multicultural critique might grow has to 
be recognized as part o f the social conditions o f a democratic culture.
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The culturalism of modernity relies on a civil-society tradition, one which 
includes the practice o f contested dialogues as the main mechanism through 
which political disputes are settled. The growth o f this tradition in South Africa 
since the demise of apartheid has been characterized by the difference-blind 
fashion in which liberalism standardly treats certain items on the agenda o f the 
public dialogue. This means that the notion of a contested dialogue has operated 
only within a space constrained by the things which are excluded -  things like the 
impact o f culture and ethnicity on the process o f nation building. These things 
would -  if  recognized -  transform the civil society matrix to reflect a politics o f 
difference centred in civil groupings seeking identity through self-definition in the 
political institutions made available by the liberal constitution.
The politicization o f the public sphere and o f the critical discourse which has 
recently grown in this arena is, o f course, an ideal o f pluralist programmes; this is 
to protect a multiplicity o f cultural spaces from the power o f the state and from 
assimilation by dominant cultures. But politicization o f the public dialogue in 
South Africa has thus far proceeded without any significant attempt to 
contextualize the debate in cultural and ethnic realities, though the nation-building 
rhetoric currently in vogue has strong nationalist overtones. This smacks of 
ideological orthodoxy (no doubt a consequence o f apartheid’s painful legacy), 
and is self-defeating in two important senses: it tends to blur the distinction 
between state and civil society (another irony, for the failure to make the 
distinction was part and parcel o f the apartheid regime’s ideological commit­
ments), and it blunts the edge o f critical theory - an edge which, in Goldberg’s 
turn of phrase “ ... depends on the national and institutional sites that constitute 
the horizons o f practice ... [M]ulti-cultural linkage o f criticism requires 
comparative contextualization ... [i.e.] sources in multiple cultural contexts so that 
the critical tools used as a wedge into understanding the production o f norms 
themselves would become objects o f scrutiny” (Goldberg, 1994:120).
The dependence on culture as a context for criticism should itself always be the 
subject of critical inquiry, for this guards against forgetfulness about how 
Western pluralist concepts are received and read in African contexts. A critical 
multiculturalism necessarily seeks “alliances o f differently contextualized 
critique” (Goldberg, 1994:121) as a bulwark against assimilation o f  differences 
by liberal cultures and the marginalizing effects o f this process (the consequences 
o f liberalisms’ failure to acknowledge culture and ethnicity as epistemically 
viable categories of difference). The critical import o f such alliances is manifested 
in the challenge offered to the alleged universals o f  liberalism’s discourses, 
particularly those advocating tolerance (of differences) and empathy (for 
minorities), founded on a concept o f a common humanity.
Goldberg’s point about the treatment o f difference in “comparative
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contextualization” can be made as a question about the starting and endpoints of 
critique. One must "  start from local critiques and then derive a larger picture 
o f what critique would mean when articulated from different positions” 
(Goldberg, 1994:123).
The recognition that cultural differences are a source o f critical force is really 
only useful if  the public sphere is truly an unconstrained space, one in which a 
variety o f identity struggles can be brought into “comparative relation” 
(Goldberg, 1994:124) without the threat of assimilation and marginalization. In 
this context the critical force o f the notion o f difference retains its edge, which is 
easily lost when culture is understood as a site o f shared or common 
understandings, a point which the “nation building”-rhetoric in South Africa 
exploits. The notion o f a critical edge which a comparative relation of alternative 
points o f view makes possible is captured in the idea that “ ... different cultures ... 
have quite different uses for the same theory -  or the same history” (Goldberg, 
1994:121).
It is possible to argue that from non-colonial perspectives o f otherness, the history 
o f South Africa could be put to a variety o f critical uses, one o f which would be 
the creation o f non-colonial spaces for an encounter with liberal histories. Such 
an encounter would impart a critical edge to the notion of difference, one which 
could lend epistemic credibility to the otherness o f alternative viewpoints. The 
critical potential o f an encounter between the different histories o f South Africa 
lies in the fact that they make available perspectives o f otherness. Liberal 
histories (for example The Oxford history o f  South Africa  edited by Monica 
Wilson and Leonard Thompson) bear witness to anthropological categories o f 
cultural difference (the influence, no doubt, of Malinowski and other 
structuralists), articulated as local, community-based “native” perspectives, 
written from the viewpoint o f liberal individualism. This viewpoint, however, 
blocks from view the very political conditions needed to account for the existence 
o f “ native” perspectives, conditions which non-colonial histories would be able 
to exploit as critical tools to rescue the “ identity” of the post-colonial subject 
from essentialism, to show that these subjects are time-bound social/historical 
constructions and to critique them and their “native” predecessors as such. Given 
Goldberg’s “comparative” approach such an encounter would amount to a 
deconstruction o f time-bound social and cultural constructions -  a levelling o f the 
playingfield for both “natives” and “colonists” .
The anthropological categories o f cultural difference which existed within the 
framework o f liberalism aided a discourse of domination during the colonial 
epoch. In South Africa today liberalism continues to dominate through its 
assimilationist mode o f operation. The way in which liberalism recognizes 
“difference” brackets all that forms part o f the substantive social life of
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individuals: assimilation operates through the non-recognition o f the Other in her 
historical or cultural setting. Civic community is conceived homogenously and 
monoculturally in the interests o f fostering the “one-nation-one-people-one 
culture” idea of democracy. In this sense liberalism is a reactionary force.
The culturalism o f modernity ceases to be culture if civic communities can be 
admitted to civil life only in some trunctuated form, stripped o f the particularity o f 
their historical and cultural settings which give substance to their social identities. 
Trunctuation creates problems of self-understanding and self-definition in 
political life, the very context through whose agency these things are actualized.
2. The political incom petence o f  the culturalism  o f modernity
2.1 The discourse theory of culture
Habermas’s comments on culture form part o f his attempts to work out a critical 
theory of society. The main theme o f Haberm as’s involvement with culture 
appears as a critique of capitalism. Pusey (1987:199) describes it as “an attempt 
to recover from the system o f exploitation inherent in capitalist production a 
potential for rational reconstruction and development o f society, which 
reconstruction would, because o f the stress on reason, have emancipatory 
potential for society”.
2.1.1 Reason and emancipation
Habermas’s involvement with reason is the foundation on which he constructs a 
theory of culture. Habermas is intent on uncovering ideologies which inform a 
community’s self-understanding and linking them to forms o f culture which have 
potential for emancipation. This, in effect, is a quest for the rational emancipation 
from ideologies which encourage domination and submission as the pattern or 
governing principle o f interaction in society (Pusey, 1987:194-209).
How does Habermas conceive o f reason’s emancipatory function? Briefly, like 
Marx, Habermas believes that the capitalist mode o f production harbour on elitist 
ideology which, in effect, manipulates both majoritarian and consensual 
(pluralistic) forms of democracy. Market relations between wage-labour and 
capital form the basis of exploitation and domination, which is made possible by 
a social organization geared to the demands o f capital accumulation. Capital 
accumulation as a structuring or governing principle o f society has to be replaced 
by a different principle o f social organization, one geared rationally to the 
satisfaction o f human needs as the primary objective. A labour theory o f  culture, 
o f the kind Marx produced, cannot provide the desired principle. The reason is 
that Marx reduces all patterns of social interaction to labour. This kind of 
(economic) reductionism identifies social integration (the process o f socialization)
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too closely with production, technology and instrumental (technical) knowledge -  
a focus too narrow for Habermas. For Habermas socialization and production are 
distinct processes, and though both have a place in Haberm as's social order, only 
socialization properly admits of rational justificatory procedures which create the 
kind of socio-cultural structures that have emancipatory potential (Sensat, 
1979:55-77). Following Sensat (1979) this thesis distinguishes between normative 
structures that link in a Marxist way to economic systems, and normative 
structures that connect, in the way Habermas wants, with the “cultural” -  a 
Lebenswelt which reason might shape in accordance with human needs.
Normative structures linking with economic systems are external to the individual
-  a self-contained lifeworld which can be separated from individual 
consciousness. Normative structures linking with culture are internal to the 
individual, in the sense that those structures make up a lifeworld out o f which the 
individual cannot step. This separation gives to reason considerable power to 
generate a critique of society, in particular, a critique o f exploitive economic 
systems like capitalism. This separation also allows Habermas to separate notions 
o f autonomy and identity from a determinist basis in economics, in a way in 
which Marx could not. But, though normative structures are separated, they 
remain tied to each other: the normative structures o f culture are “ superstructural” 
(Pusey, 1987:198), and this means that culture is a superstructural phenomenon, 
resting on the normative structures o f socio-economic systems. So Habermas’s 
separation is not complete -  economic structures condition cultural structures, 
though they are not the only factors at play; rational justifications of normative 
structures and rationally secured social agreements are as important. Culture has 
to be understood as rational social action -  it is a rational form o f communicative 
action. The idea o f culture understood as communicative action is very simple -  
culture is something subjects or agents create, in thought and deed with the help 
o f reason, guided by the normative structures of particular socio-economic 
systems.
It is apparent from what has been said that Habermas gives considerable 
normative force to rationality. Rationality is understood not only as purposive or 
instrumental -  as having structure-forming power in so far as it creates cultural 
structures. It also has intrinsic value understood as emancipatory potential, which 
is value in itself. In this regard rationality mediates all social relations, and to do 
this it must necessarily be embedded in the common or shared understandings of 
a community, as contained in its various self-understandings. Thus understood 
rationality is “ linguistically mediated social interaction” (Pusey, 1987:199), which 
includes a critical component: a power to restructure society along rationally 
agreed lines. This critical component is its “emancipatory potential” (Pusey, 
1987:199). This is just rationality understood as a property o f human thought and
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language -  a quality directed to asking and answering questions about human 
needs and the social conditions required for their fulfilment.
2.1.2 History, reason and legitimacy
2.1.2.1 The public and private spheres
The rise o f the modem era was marked by the following:
•  the separation between the “public” and “private” spheres (or between “civil” 
and “civic” society),
• the development in society of the idea o f agency rights, and
• finally the development o f the idea o f a public forum o f discourse (or public 
discursive space) which served as the arena within which opposing moral and 
political views could be debated.
It is possible for societies to particularize by making use o f a range o f informal 
interpersonal practices, created through conflict between the needs o f  agents to 
pursue local goals and a communual need for basic collective solidarity1. 
Individuated public spaces -  whether individuated through commerce, science, 
religion etc. -  form civic societies; collectively they form civil society. Civic 
society permits the growth o f various solidarities among interest groups, usually 
in opposition to the established civil authority. Civil society is best understood as 
an institutionalized correlate o f the political authority, and cannot be defined in 
terms which express opposition to the state. Civic society, by contrast, is a form 
of social organization embedded within civil society acting as a countervailing 
force to civil society.
Civic society becomes the arena in which the values o f various interest groups are 
confirmed. Since civic society is managed by interest groups, the public spaces 
generated are small enough to permit social meanings and their interpretations to 
be contested and rewritten. Autonomy is protected by the fact that the boundary 
between civic and civil society creates a legitimate private realm, which, by 
virtue o f its oppositional nature, could engage in critical dialogue with the public 
(civil) realm.
Generating consensus or agreement through the contested dialogue o f  a public 
debate has a significant spin-off. Thus conceptions o f  the good life are privatized 
(within a civic grouping) before being pushed out onto the agenda o f  the public 
dialogue, where they compete for legitimation. No belief to which anyone may
1 For my understanding of the "private-public” distinction 1 am indebted to Buchowski (1979)
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be deeply committed -  such as the belief that a sexual division o f labour is 
morally wrong because it oppresses women and hinder their attainment o f 
personhood can be excluded, and so no-one is prevented from seeking the 
widest possible forum to arrive at a consensus. The contested dialogue o f a 
public debate renegotiates and redefines the boundary between “private” and 
“public”, since it helps to define the nature o f the issues that get pushed onto the 
agenda o f  the public dialogue and since parties discover what their deepest 
disagreements or agreements are, only once the process o f public dialogue has 
run its course. Benhabib (1992:100) notes that struggles to off-set the effects of 
power differentials in any context begin with a redefinition o f what had 
previously been considered “private” (such as all matters relating to the 
household), and therefore not matters o f public concern (i.e. not matters for 
debate on a public agenda). This flexibility in a society to (re)negotiate the 
boundary between “private” and “public” cannot be frozen as long as it is 
permissible to question the rules o f participation in the dialogue. This means that 
the boundary cannot be redrawn in such a way that it limits the reach o f moral 
particularity o f civic society into civil society. A consequence o f this is that the 
boundary cannot prevent privately held values from becoming public shared 
norms, and therefore that it cannot limit civic autonomy. Indeed, where the 
boundary is drawn is a matter for negotiation and rests ultimately on consensus.
The picture that emerges here is that of bourgeois culture and society in which a 
“procedural type o f legitimacy” becomes the norm in moral and political matters. 
Habermas (1979:184-185) says:
The form al conditions o f  justification  them selves obtain legitim ating force 
... the level o f  justification  has becom e reflective and the procedures and 
presuppositions o f  justification  are them selves now the legitim ating grounds 
on w hich the validity o f  legitim ations is based. The idea o f  an agreem ent 
that com es to pass all parties, as free and equal, determ ines the procedural 
type o f  legitim acy o f  m odem  times.
2.1.2.2 Agency rights
How did “the procedural type of legitimacy” manifest itself in society? If 
Habermas is right, the procedural republic developed in the wake o f the failure of 
ontologically grounded justifications (God or nature) and became the proper 
setting o f justification by consensus (Pusey, 1987:194). Two developments in 
this regard are o f special significance.
•  Because society has become culturally pluralistic, it becomes necessary to 
create scope for differences between individuals and groups which are to be 
integrated in social structures.
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•  The resolution of conflict between culture and social integration takes the form 
of a reordering o f social relationships. The idea of a fixed, invariant 
conception of justice is confined to a public sphere in which the political 
authority o f the state is limited, and in which relations between individuals are 
subject to principles secured by rational agreement. Beyond this sphere, 
individuals are free to pursue their self-chosen ends and goods. This is the 
civic space referred to above -  within it people are free to follow diverse 
values and interests without having to secure the approval o f others and 
without having to suffer legal liabilities for their choices.
Central to this conception o f public space lies a conception o f  human beings as 
agents whose agency has cash-value in society because the purpose o f  agency -  
social integration -  is culturally anchored2. The social nature o f our agency 
determines that we think of ourselves as social constructions whose hopes o f a 
shared, just society can be realized in the promise o f social solidarity which only 
culture can offer -  and this is because the cultural is irreducibly collective. Now, 
the link between agency and rights is a social given. Indeed, it is a function o f the 
split between “public” and “private”, which created the need for private space in 
which agents may act autonomously, and the need for state protected space in 
which an ongoing debate about the basic structure o f society may continue. In 
this context rights can only be defined with reference to agency. This has a major 
effect on social integration, but one which enhances the potential for autonomous 
action. The scope of the political authority becomes limited to enforcing only 
those rules or norms which participants in the discursive space accept as 
rationally binding on all. These rules protect the private and autonomously 
chosen space o f individuals and groups to pursue their own distinctive ends. 
Human agency, then, provided a conceptual basis for a system o f rights -  in 
particular, agency rights, because they recognize and create scope for the 
exercise o f human capacity for agency.
To treat someone as an agent is to treat her in terms o f her capacity for agency. 
At a minimum this means treating her as one capable o f autonomous choice, or as 
one capable o f choosing on the basis o f reasons. How autonomous are these 
reasons? Habermas’s discursive public space is the sociological correlate o f  his 
discourse concept o f legitimacy -  it is the arena in which dialogues o f legitimacy 
take place and legitimacy is confirmed (Benhabib, 1992:103). Habermas views 
this space democratically as the space in which the rules o f participation and 
procedures are open to reformulation and reinterpretation by those who 
participate. This space, then, does not stand under the constraints o f neutrality 
i.e. the rule which govern the dialogue does not pretend to be neutral between
2 For my understanding o f  the link between “ rights” and “agency” I am indebted to M oon (1993).
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competing conceptions o f the good which enter the dialogue, but are rather 
themselves written in terms of these conceptions whenever a dialogue takes place 
(Benhabib, 1992:105). The public sphere can be any discursive space and comes 
into existence whenever and wherever parties engage in discourse, evaluating the 
general social and political norms which govern their society. There may be as 
many public spaces at any given time as there are debates about the validity of 
social norms. And these are autonomous public spaces or spheres, making for a 
plurality of viewpoints, a fact which greatly encourages the democratization of 
civil society.
The autonomy of each space in this plural landscape is substantive and not merely 
formal. Thus, though the autonomy of each space is subject to the constraints of 
a practical discourse in which the criterion o f what counts as a good argument 
depends heavily on shared meanings and practices that make up the 
communicative structures o f everyday life, each space may legitimately legislate 
on substantive nonnative issues. Normative issues include the following 
consensual generation o f norms in debates which challenge tradition, the 
development o f individual identities outside conventional role and gender 
definitions as well as the relevance o f cultural tradition for self-definition. The 
mentioned cultural tradition for self-definition has been becoming increasingly 
autonomous i.e. dependent on individuals’ reflective and critical abilities rather 
than on rigid role understanding or the appropriation o f exemplars from history. 
The main problem in mediating relations between civic and civil society is not so 
much to persuade rational agents that they should accept the moral constraints of 
their forum, but rather to create a culture of discourse to mediate among opposing 
moral conceptions o f what morality demands of us. The social significance of 
this issue -  its actual manifestation in society -  walks hand in hand with the 
growth o f  appeal to a rational justification for morality3. They are inseparable 
social phenomena. Creating a culture o f discourse is, for Habermas, a strategy 
for creating a morally just political order.
2.1.2.3 Discursive public space
According to Habermas discursive spaces do not operate under the procedural 
constraints o f neutrality. By this is meant that the conversational constraints set 
by Habermas’s discourse o f legitimation reject the claim that any reason for 
action can be a good reason if it is maintained that this conception o f the good is 
better than those advanced by others. For Habermas the openness (Offent- 
lichheit) o f discourse cannot be overridden by “morally neutral” constraints about 
the way in which discourse must take place. Accordingly, the only constraints
3 See Benhabib’s (1992) reconstruction o f H aberm as’s views.
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Habermas recognizes are those which arise from practical discourse itself, and 
these are specified by the shared meanings and practices that make up the 
communicative structures o f the everyday life-world. These constraints are 
themselves normative, and take the form o f conditions o f  participation rather than 
criteria o f procedural equality or neutrality. Habermas assumes that at minimum 
they are conditions o f universal moral respect and egalitarian reciprocity, 
conditions he believes to be compatible with the democratization o f society, 
which he sees as a growth in the plurality o f autonomous public (civic) spheres 
and spaces (Benhabib, 1992:29-31). These constraints, he believes, avoid the 
problems of elitism and inegalitarianism, working rather for consensus in his 
vision of a plurality o f discursive democracies.
The condition o f universal moral respect requires that participants recognize the 
right o f all beings capable of speech and action to be party to the moral 
conversation. The condition of egalitarian reciprocity requires that every 
participant in the moral conversation must have the same symmetrical rights to 
various speech acts, to initiate speech (i.e. the topics o f conversation), and to 
request reflection on the presuppositions o f the conversation. The latter, o f 
course, allows that the rules o f the conversation game can be contested within the 
game itself, but only insofar as participants accept to abide by the conditions of 
participation in playing the game. The rules o f the game no less than their inter­
pretation are contestable, but contestation does not mean that they can be 
rewritten in such a way that the conditions o f participation are suspended because 
this would mean that parties to the conversation enter the dialogue without the 
required “will” to arrive at consensus.
How are these constraints (conditions o f participation) o f the moral conversation 
justified? Habermas argues that as rules o f fair debate these constraints are 
“universal-pragmatic” presuppositions (of fairness) which can be viewed as a set 
o f procedural rules (Benhabib, 1992:30). This view, is, o f  course, standardly 
liberalist because it embodies the moral ideal that we ought to respect each other 
as beings whose moral standpoints are deserving equal consideration. This view 
also implies that we ought to respect each other as human beings whose capacity 
for expressing a standpoint (communicative competence) we ought to enhance 
every time we create a discursive democracy (which is wherever and whenever 
we create civil or civil discursive spaces). There is no justification for these 
constraints beyond these considerations.
The central question at issue in Haberm as’s discursive spaces (whether civic or 
civil) can be formulated as a request for universal moral principles o f  action: 
What principles do participants recognize or agree to as being legitimate, given 
their history and circumstances? This question is, for Habermas, the test o f 
communicative agreement. But, we may ask, agreement in what context?
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•  A moral/political landscape with a plurality of discursive democracies
Is it enough to achieve communicative agreement in autonomous civic societies? 
Or must such agreement be strictly universalized across civic boundaries, i.e. 
must the reach or scope o f principle be extended to civil rather than just to civic 
society? It is instructive to note that for Habermas the conditions o f participation 
are universalizable in the sense that they become intersubjective procedures of 
argumentation for all civic groupings (Benhabib, 1992:36-37). Any principle of 
action adopted in a civic grouping can, in principle, not conflict with the 
conditions o f participation, because that would be in conflict with the idea of 
communicative agreement. Since this idea of communicative agreement defines a 
weak sense of justification, all principles o f action are strictly subject to weak 
justification. (A strong justification would require that the status o f Habermas’s 
conditions as pragm atic universals be dropped.) But within this broad parameter 
many different agreements are possible. Habermas wishes to retain a moral/ 
political landscape in which a plurality o f discursive democracies are possible. 
How is this possible?
•  Haberm as’s participatory view of public discourse
Habermas takes a participatory view -  rather than an integrationist one -  o f 
public discourse because he sees the problem of modernity as one characterized 
by a sense o f the loss o f moral and political agency, particularly the efficacy of 
agency -  rather than a loss o f a sense o f belonging and solidarity (Benhabib, 
1992:77). He thinks that the intersubjective constitution o f the self and of self­
identity through communicative interaction are adequately taken care o f within 
civic groupings (which have non-exclusive principles o f membership). So he 
rather wishes to stress differentiation between communicative agreements, and 
the autonomous status o f the discursive spheres within which agreements are 
reached. Differentiation is, according to Habermas, a force working for the 
consensual generation o f norms because it creates the required social bonds 
within which decisions can be made regarding the distribution o f social goods. 
This has the significant spin-off that it empowers agents -  they create 
autonomous principles o f social life, gaining thereby a sense o f  agency and 
efficacy. And since they create these principles autonomously -  without the 
threat o f  subversion by the civil authority -  they are better placed to understand 
the nature o f the social bond which defines their identity and to comprehend its 
meaning (what it offers them in terms o f self-understanding). Democratization 
which allows tradition to be subjected to critique and revision at the level 
Habermas thinks is necessary to overcome the alienating conditions o f  modernity 
encapsulates something o f the integrationist view, but at a level which remains 
sensitive to the local and the historical.
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• Differentiation as a focus on justice
Habermas’s emphasis on a “participation” understanding o f  society raises social 
differentiation to a high level o f value. In Habermas, differentiation takes the 
form o f a focus on justice. Judgements o f justice constitute the hard core o f all 
(deontological) morality (Benhabib, 1992:72). Because differentiation (and the 
preservation of autonomy) is so important, Habermas believes that significant 
work in morality can be done only in the realm o f self-other relations, particularly 
to structure such relations. Indeed, judgements o f justice reflect conceptions o f 
self-other relations. The formation o f self-identity and justice are therefore linked. 
Judgements concerning the good life fall outside the ambit o f this project because 
the whole point o f structuring self-other relations is to set agents free (i.e. create 
private space for them) to pursue their choices. In this latter respect the liberties 
o f competent communicators cannot be limited or curtailed for the sake o f some 
specific (substantive) conception of the social good or welfare. So with respect 
to judgements about the good life, individual rights trump the collective will. But 
not so with justice. Judgements o f justice are the foundation stone o f  the freedom 
o f civic groupings to reach communicative agreement, and must therefore rest on 
real/actual discourses (and not hypothetical ones) which take the conditions of 
participants -  their particularity -  as a starting point for their dialogue. This 
means in effect that justification and contextualization in real situations run 
together. Only those norms can claim legitimacy that meet -  or could meet -  with 
the real situations o f participants in their capacity as participants in practical 
discourse.
2.1.3 Habermasian reactionism
Does this project succeed? In particular, does Haberm as’s social order empower 
agents in the sense that it restores a sense of the efficacy o f their agency? And 
does it encourage the growth o f self-identity? Habermas constructs a “ super- 
structural” notion o f culture from the idea o f a plurality o f divergent universes o f 
discourses. But ultimately his concept o f communicative rationality -  in 
particular, the pragmatic universal presuppositions of public dialogue -  appeal to 
a notion of cultural unity. This cultural unity requires that all validity claims be 
redeemable within specific discourses -  a culture which also elevates the force of 
argument to the final court o f appeal. So, though Habermas seemingly opts for a 
participatory approach, his concept o f communicative rationality contains within 
itself an assimilationist ideal which militates against cultural pluralism and the 
traditionalism of civic groupings. This assimilationist ideal is achieved by pro­
moting a concept o f civil community which is both homogeneous and 
monocultural, and which resists the cultural and ethnic particularity o f civic 
groupings. It is indeed, whatever potential for this kind o f  particularity exists at 
the civic level, transformed into a single identity at the level o f civil society. 
Civic community, to have any sense o f coherent identity, is likely to fall victim to
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the shared order o f being which Habermas’s concept o f communicative rationality 
engenders.
If all this is correct, the autonomy of criticism (understood as the contested 
dialogue) easily falls victim to sponsorship and control by the state. Civic 
discursive spaces cease to be unconstrained spaces which help to shape struggles 
over self-definition and identity. Indeed, since difference falls victim to the 
monoculturalism o f Habermas’s concept o f communicative rationality, it is not 
difficult to see how easily the multiplicity o f discursive democracies fall prey to 
assimilation by a reactionary cultural politics.
3. Adapting the culturalism  o f liberalism
3.1 Difference versus identity
Liberal pluralism, in the version defended by Habermas, attempts to derive the 
effectiveness o f discourse as a social critique from a transcendental perspective. 
This is perhaps the central reason why the critique which communicative 
rationality generates loses the critical force o f the cultural, and thereby whatever 
force the notion o f difference could have. Now, one way o f bringing about a 
reconciliation between the professed ideals o f pluralism, and their realization in 
practice, is through a reformulation o f the liberal tradition. This is what Kymlicka 
(1989) and Taylor (1995) attempt to accomplish.
Kymlicka (1989:162-181) places the cultural and the historical at the centre o f an 
attempt to rehabilitate notions o f citizenship and community as the basis for a 
substantive approach to participation in the liberal democracy. There is a sense 
in which culture is a determinant o f  choice.
• First, decisions about ways o f life are informed by culture in so far as the 
range o f alternatives is determined by the cultural heritage.
•  Second, it is only within a culturally specified range o f options that we decide 
which roles to adopt and which ones have value for us.
•  Third, cultural membership makes these options and our decisions about them 
meaningful to us.
Taken together, these points suggest that loss o f cultural membership is a 
fundamental loss which affects our capacity to judge the value o f our life plans.
Culture is, however, not just a determinant o f choice. It is also a determinant o f  
identity. One way of showing a connection between cultural membership and 
identity is through language. The sociologist, J. Fishman (1972:4), argues that 
“ language is never simply a neutral medium for identifying the contents o f our
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activities -  rather it itself is content, a reference for loyalties and animosities, a 
marker of societal goals, the large-scale value-laden arenas o f interaction that 
typify every speech community” .
Another way o f showing the connection is through history, especially a history of 
oppression. The South African political activist, F. Mkhwanazi (1985:18), says 
the following about black oppression and the loss o f a sense o f personal efficacy: 
“The regime tried to make us believe that our people had no history ... they 
wanted us to carry an image o f ourselves as pathetic, utterly defeated, dependent, 
incapable and powerless” .
Miller (1989) shows that ethnographers and historians have great power over 
oppressed people inasmuch as they can fix an identity for them. A case in point 
is the creation o f the Pokomo as a “backward” group in East Africa. A rigid 
system o f colonial control over agriculture constrained and disadvantaged this 
group through the creation o f  a “backward” identity, and various stereotypes 
associated with that identity. A similar theme is evident in the work o f the 
anthropologist Hayt Alverson (1978). Alverson explores patterns o f dependency 
between the impoverished rural Tswana people o f South Africa and the labour­
intensive mining economy in which they strove for self-sufficiency. He articulates 
this striving in terms of their concept o f “wanting-to-do”, and shows that the 
laying of plans for life through culturally recognized work is basic to their self­
identity and that this persisted in the face o f dehumanizing work conditions under 
the migrant labour system. The African historian, Wunyabari M aloba (1993), 
examines the psychology o f dispossession as a cause o f  the anticolonial Mau- 
Mau revolt. Dispossession o f land led to a complete disjuncture with M au-M au 
history, a break with notions o f  community as these people understood it, and 
concomitantly, with their self-identity, which created a trauma about which 
colonial records have had little to say. All this makes sense on the assumption 
that personal agency is tied to a cultural heritage, and that a cultural structure 
imparts a sense o f self-identity. The upshot is that since our ability to choose and 
to actualize our humanity can be developed only in a certain kind o f social 
context we have a duty, and necessarily so, to sustain that context. An empirical 
fact about the vulnerability o f cultural structures -  they are fragile and they can be 
damaged and even destroyed (see Kymlicka, 1989:162-181) -  commits us to their 
preservation.
Contexts of choice and identity are primary goods in Raw ls’s sense i.e. 
sustaining a cultural structure is as significant in a just society as protecting 
liberties and securing conditions o f equality o f opportunity. Kyinlicka’s cultural 
thesis has a significant spin-off which counterbalances the difiference-blindness to 
which liberalism standardly falls victim. This is why multicultural states need to 
make provision for differential citizenship rights (group or minority rights) as a
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necessary premise o f the equal respect people are owed as members o f specific 
cultural communities. Kymlicka’s argument (Kymlicka, 1989:38), which begins 
with the liberal principle that people are responsible for their choices, though not 
necessarily for their circumstances, offers as its major premise the view that 
differences in resources which affect people’s choices arise from their 
circumstances. Unequal circumstances which may inhibit and even penalize 
participation in the political community constitute an area o f illegitimate 
inequality. A cultural minority, or even a marginalized culture, is not responsible 
for the disadvantages it suffers in its attempts to maintain its integrity, if  those 
disadvantages are due to unequal social circumstances. Furthermore, the benefits 
o f dominance which accrue to a dominant culture comes without cost to its 
members, but these benefits are beyond the purchase power o f minoritized or 
marginalized individuals; they have to pay to secure whatever is valuable to their 
cultural heritage, which leaves them with less resources to pursue other cultural 
projects. Spending their resources on securing mere survival is not a problem 
which members o f the dominant cultures face -  indeed, they get if for free. The 
minority cultures should then be compensated for their disadvantages by state 
recognition o f special group rights.
It is not difficult to see that the source of Kymlicka’s argument for special rights 
protecting minority and marginalized cultures from the disintegrating and 
assimilating effects of decisions made by people outside these cultures, rests on 
the context o f identity variant in his argument. A context o f choice can be 
degraded and difficult to maintain because a context o f identity is threatened. 
The unequal costs associated with differential social circumstances, which 
requires additional (state sponsored) resources to give threatened cultures equal 
life-chances, should then be justified with reference to the considerations of 
cultural identity. It is worth noting here that Kymlicka’s major objection to 
assimilationist policies invokes the identity postulate: “ ... cultural membership 
affects our very sense o f personal identity and capacity ...” (Kymlicka 1989:175).
The identity postulate contains a revisability criterion. “ ... we lead our life from 
the inside, in accordance with our beliefs about what gives value to life ... [Yet 
we must] be free to question those beliefs, to examine them in the light of 
whatever information and examples and arguments our culture can provide 
(Kymlicka, 1989:184).
The argument that minoritized or marginalized cultural groups will be 
handicapped with reference to the primary good of cultural membership by 
circumstances for which they are not responsible is a variant o f the politics o f 
difference, but with strong overtones o f an identity politics. (Circumstances 
which handicap minoritized people and for which they are not responsible should, 
however, as an imperative of justice, and by special rights, be redressed.)
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Referring to South Africa, Kymlicka remarks that justice is not necessarily 
guaranteed by a system of plural citizenships and special rights o f the kind he is 
advocating; an appeal to justice (i.e. special rights) is properly called for only for 
those communities who find themselves in circumstances o f cultural vulnerability.
The major problem with this appeal is that it is perceived as violating equal 
protection guarantees. The major political task, then, “is to devise constitutional 
provisions ... which will be flexible enough to allow for the legitimate claims of 
cultural membership, but which are not so flexible as to allow systems o f racial or 
cultural oppression” (Kymlicka, 1989:255).
In other words, though identity variants are critical in that they guarantee a 
recognition of differences, they must not be so strong that difference is 
compromised. How this might be practically possible is unsatisfactorily answered 
by the reusability criterion, for this criterion requires that there should be cultural 
borders, but does not specify their degree o f interrelationability. For Peters 
(1995:49) such a state o f indeterminacy is unsatisfactory. “The deconstruction of 
the logic o f identity reveals how the binary oppositions generated by it [difference 
versus identity], in fact, require one another for their assertion. A politics o f 
difference, by contrast, unfreezes fixed identities, recognizing that they are both 
relational and contextual” .
A strong emphasis on identity variants in political institutions tend to repress the 
particularity o f group differences and the heterogeneity o f group experiences 
because the logic which this emphasis generates produces a political climate 
favouring conformity -  cultural and national. In such a climate interrelationability 
between groups privileges the growth of a national culture over differentiated 
group cultures which might otherwise co-exist as equals in a form o f political 
parallelism.
3.2 Recognition and identity
Like Habermas, Taylor too is concerned with the efficacy o f agency. Taylor 
(1994:75) advocates the practice he calls “the politics o f recognition” .
The dem and for recognition ... is given urgency by the supposed links 
betw een recognition and identity. The thesis is that our identity  is partly  
shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the m vrecognition  o f  others, 
and so a person or group o f  people can suffer real dam age, real d istortion, if  
the people or society around them  m irror back to them  a confin ing or 
dem eaning or contem ptible picture o f  them selves.
Taylor’s politics o f recognition is intended to serve as a corrective to a blind spot 
in plural liberalism. This concerns the impact o f power differentials on the 
distribution o f rights. Taylor (1994:81-82) argues that a “discourse of
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recognition” has come to mean two things: pluralist liberals tend to forget that 
the rights in force at any time in the life o f a community have been constituted on 
the exclusion or subordination o f some category o f the Other (e.g. gender, race, 
etc.), and that in consequence a historical gap has arisen between persons able to 
translate their rights into substantive benefits, and those who have not been able 
to do so. This is a problem in post-apartheid South Africa which has been 
unsuccessfully addressed in the current “difference-blind” spaces of our public 
discourses. The reason for the forgetfulness about historical disadvantage is a 
consequence of one-level political thinking which recognizes the equal dignity of 
all citizens, but which accords everyone little more than a formal recognition of 
rights and other entitlements.
The second meaning has arisen from the interplay between identity and difference 
as binary oppositions in liberal pluralism. Though an emphasis on difference 
recognizes identity and distinctness, liberal pluralism has obliterated significant 
categories o f difference in the interests o f a (false) monocultural politics, which 
works on the basis o f the “one-level” thinking just referred to. What does it mean 
to receive equal recognition in the public arena o f political life? Taylor’s first line 
o f thought begins with the idea that all members of a political community are 
equally entitled to respect because they are all members o f the human race. This 
line o f thought is difference-blind in the right sense. The second line of thought 
does not reject the ideal o f our entitlement to an equality o f respect (or dignity), 
but regards this as itself insufficient. This entitlement needs to be amplified by a 
(public) recognition of our differences. We are asked to recognize distinct 
identities, particularly cultural identities, as morally significant categories. 
Taylor’s main argument is that moral identities are formed by recognition. 
Misrecognition counts as a harm because it deforms identity (women, people of 
colour, and even people who prefer to live in stone-age technologies, like the 
Inuit o f  Canada, are victims of misrecognition). Marginalized groups tend to 
internalize deformed images of themselves, making deformity a constitutive part 
o f their self-expression.
The second line o f thought complements the first, and is seen as a counterweight 
to the assimilationist tendencies o f the first. The first line o f thought -  the line o f  
equal dignity -  champions nondiscrimination and advocates difference-blindness: 
given any case, no one is entitled to differential treatment unless there are good 
(publicly defended and accepted) reasons why some particular individual should 
be treated differently. The second line o f thought -  the line o f  unique identity 
argues that in order to attain a political community in which nondiscrimination is 
the norm, we need to make distinctions between different cultural communities -  
distinctions which call for differential treatment as morally justified (given the 
particular history o f disadvantaged communities).
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• The line of unique identity
The line of unique identity identifies two main areas in which the recognition of 
difference is necessary and differential treatment justified. In some South African 
communities a great many people have been handicapped by poverty which has 
reduced their citizen rights to second and even third class status. It does not help 
to offer these people citizenship rights without social programmes designed to 
alleviate their poverty and upgrade the status o f their citizenship rights. Inherited 
poverty traps are difficult to overcome and mark a difference which citizen rights 
itself cannot eliminate. The mere award o f  citizenship rights is difference-blind in 
the wrong sense in that it perpetuates a social order in which asymmetrical power 
relations between rich and poor remain in force. There is, o f course, a problem 
with social programmes designed to alleviate the social conditions o f historically 
disadvantaged groups. Such programmes tend to be assimilationist, i.e. they tend 
to assimilate disadvantaged groups to the cultural identity of the communities 
which dominate the political life o f  the society at large, a fact which tends to 
reinforce the “ inferior” status o f the disadvantaged cultures. The politically 
dominant or hegemonic culture assimilates the particularity o f the disadvantaged 
cultures into a homogeneous mould. In so far as the disadvantaged groups take 
on an alien form, they lose their particular identities. Their identities are 
suppressed, and this itself is highly discriminatory and inegalitarian.
Taylor, however, believes that equal recognition will resist this kind o f 
marginalization. For instance, the hegemonic success o f  the white culture in 
South Africa was mainly due to the fact that values deriving from the cultural 
capital o f the white culture were falsely presented as universal values. Prior to 
the demise o f apartheid the allegedly universalist status o f white values was used 
as a divisive tool separating white and black and securing political power for the 
white culture. It is important to note that white values are embedded in white 
cultures and as such they are particularities, though they have masqueraded as 
universally valid. There is in this falsehood a lesson to be leamt from the post­
apartheid era. The difference-blind value structures which have gained pride o f 
place in the current political life o f South Africa also claim to be universalist in so 
far as our capacity for moral action is recognized as a capacity all human beings 
share. It is thus in virtue o f this capacity that all human beings are regarded as 
deserving equal respect and dignity. This is the right sense o f the difference-blind 
values mentioned above. But we must take care that the wrong sense o f 
difference-blind values do not override the right sense, i.e. do not override the 
values of particularity, particularly those values associated with our need to be 
recognized for who we are and where we come from. This capacity for defining 
one’s own identity as one constituted by the identity o f one’s cultural community 
must likewise be respected equally in everyone. In this respect it is not enough to 
recognize that we all have the same potential for moral action; we must also
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guard against the idea that some cultures are more valuable than others, for in 
entertaining this possibility we deny human equality.
A politics o f equal recognition -  such as the one being defended here -  will be 
one hospitable to difference because of the following reasons:
-  Such a politics does not only insist on uniform entitlements (rights to liberty, 
freedom from unlawful arrest, equality before the law etc.), but also looks at 
the worth o f these entitlements, particularly for historically disadvantaged 
communities.
-  A politics o f equal recognition takes the collective goals o f cultural 
communities seriously, which means recognizing cultural differences and 
making space in the public (political) forum for these differences in the 
attempt to construct a common political identity.
4. Radical dem ocracy: a critique
4.1 Mouffe’s parallelism
Mouffe (1992) characterizes parallelism as a kind of political association that can 
be “enjoyed among relative strangers belonging to many purposive associations 
[civic communities] and whose allegiances to specific communities is not seen as 
conflicting with their membership in the civil association” (Mouffe, 1992:233).
This civil association is modelled on Oakesholt’s republica, a “practice o f civility 
... specifying not performances, but conditions to be subscribed to in choosing 
performances (Mouffe, 1992:232).
Since this form o f political association admits a multiplicity o f substantive ideas 
o f the common good -  embodied in specific civic associations -  the conditions at 
issue here take the form of a “complex o f rules” (Mouffe, 1992:32), and 
identification which encourages the idea o f a common bond (rather than a 
common good) as the ground of a common political identity. Mouffe (1992:235) 
characterizes this common identity, which is the basis o f citizenship, as an 
“articulating principle” making possible the “different subject positions” o f the 
agent (i.e. different social relations engendered by such categories as gender, 
class, race, ethnicity, culture etc.) and holding “civic” and “civil” in a state of 
balance. Civic associations are “private”, and the practices and rules o f civility 
are “public”, but the two identities of the “decentred” subject “exist in a 
permanent tension that can never be reconciled” (Mouffe, 1992:238).
This impossibility is the baseline of M ouffe’s argument for a genuine parallelism. 
A multicultural parallelism would require a different conception o f the subject -  
one which stresses the constitutive role o f a multiplicity o f subject positions and a
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multiplicity o f social identities. To the extent that such a decentred subject 
displaces a unitary subject, to that extent the homogeneous unity of national 
culture would be unable to subvert the identity o f different cultural groups 
(Mouffe, 1992:233). And it is not difficult to see why, for the decentred subject 
difference is no longer a deficiency or threat and so cannot serve as the basis o f 
cultural oppression or domination -  provided, o f course, that a genuine 
parallelism holds sway.
Mouffe’s “decentred” self remains effacious in her agency in two ways: the 
possibility o f her agency in one sphere o f social life cannot be diminished by her 
position in another sphere, and membership o f the various spheres cannot become 
mutually exclusive. Two things hold the argument in place: The idea o f  a 
decentred self, an “ensemble of subject positions” constructed in the “discursive 
surfaces” (Mouffe, 1992:237) o f public dialogue, and the idea that civic and civil 
identities -  conceptualized as “forms o f identification” (Mouffe, 1992:237) -  
resist each other, and therefore create a space for a contested dialogue. Within 
this dialogue questions about identity and difference can be raised without fear o f 
compromise, without fear o f collapsing into binary oppositions on a single scale 
of assimilation.
These ideas create an interesting point o f interaction between Goldberg, Mouffe, 
Kymlicka and Taylor, in opposition to Habermas’s homogenization o f culture and 
politics. Kymlicka’s concern with a cultural context as moral category, and 
Taylor’s concern with egalitarian relations between such contexts -  based on the 
humanistic assumption that all cultures have “something important to say to all 
human beings” (Taylor, 1994:98) -  complement M ouffe’s efforts at dispelling the 
idea of a binary opposition between difference and identity. A civil space which 
can accommodate both identity and difference, again, is a space in which 
Goldberg’s “comparative contextualization” would generate the critical tools 
needed to sustain values like egalitarian reciprocity, mutual respect and the 
recognition of difference.
Do the critics o f the monoculturalism o f modernity sketch a viable alternative? 
The outstanding feature o f Kymlicka’s work is the importance he attaches to the 
condition o f constitutiveness. Community is constitutive o f the contexts in which 
choice and identity are nurtured, and this is a good reason for any community to 
claim the right for the protection o f its (collective) cultural identity. The cultural 
spaces Kymlicka creates in his tapestry o f a multicultural politics are (to some 
unspecified degree) interrelational; they do not freeze or fix identities but rather 
attempt to contextualize the process o f identity formation within and between 
cultural spaces, in the way Mouffe’s views require. Recognition (affirmation) of 
identity-in-difference -  in the sense Taylor requires -  which gives to both identity 
and difference their dues, refrains from forcing membership o f any particular
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group on anyone. This too overlaps with Mouffe. Though Taylor sees community 
as constitutive o f identity, interrelationability prevents membership from 
becoming a limitation on individuals’ autonomy. The former South African 
homelands policy bears witness to the consequences o f misrecognition and forced 
or fixed group membership. Taylor’s plea for equal recognition (and equal worth 
of citizenship) is in line with Kymlicka’s recommendations, which are flexible 
enough to allow systems of cultural membership, but not so flexible as to allow 
oppression.
Taylor’s theme also interacts with Mouffe’s concerns. Neglecting differences by 
focusing too sharply on “equality” leads to assimilation and the loss o f the 
specific identities o f communities. Accentuating the specific characteristics of 
different communities, however, leads to the exaltation of collective identities and 
the signalization o f others as completely Other, i.e. as persons whose cultures are 
in principle inaccessible. Mouffe (1992:225-239) argues that, given the treatment 
o f “ identity” and “difference” as binary opposites a focus on differential treat­
ments and the appropriate social measures that might be implemented as an 
expression o f newly discovered sensitivity to differences, may have the opposite 
o f the intended outcomes viz. assimilation, marginalization and minoritizing. In 
multicultural societies such outcomes are invited by the identity variant present in 
the appeal to a collective identity -  the equalizing force o f the difference-blind 
values o f liberal pluralism which transforms multiplicity into a new uniformity. 
For Mouffe the most effective counter lies in a reconceptualization o f the subject
-  her idea o f “decentred” subject capable o f occupying different subject 
positions. This idea implies a notion o f social cohesion quite different from that 
defended by Habermas. But, since Mouffe does not work this out in any detail, I 
tum to Ryan (1989) to show what Mouffe’s views might entail.
4.2 Ryan’s hypothesis for a post-revolutionary society
In Habermas a unitary culture is premised on the separation of questions of 
justice (and rights) from questions about the good life, which is a function o f the 
separation o f the public and private spheres. Judgements about justice fall within 
the ambit o f the public sphere and are subject to the validating norms o f public 
discourse. Judgements about the good life pertain to the private sphere, and are 
not open to regulation or interference by the civil authorities. This draws an 
“ inside”/“outside” (“ interior”/“exterior”) boundary in the psyche o f the subject, 
and in society, but one which allows the public sphere to colonize the private 
sphere through the validating norms o f public discourse.
Ryan takes issues with these dichotomies on several counts, but his most 
pertinent criticism focuses on liberalism’s understanding o f equality as a formal 
principle o f equal treatment. Briefly, Ryan argues that the liberal ideal o f equality 
is merely a form o f juridical equality, which is a consequence o f the “public-
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private” distinction. This ideal arises from liberalism principles o f rational justice 
which are developed apart from the “actual material situation o f the social world” 
(Ryan, 1987:168). The consequences of this, as Ryan (1987:168) points out, are 
unjust.
The ideal o f  equal treatm ent then becom es a m eans o f  ju stify in g  the 
existence o f  that particular social situation. If  all are treated  equally  by the 
law, then the em pirical specificities o f  social inequality  can be m ade to 
seem legitimate. They are the result o f  fair play  regulated by fa ir rules or 
principles. In this schem e, then, the rational principle o f  equality  is the 
cause o f  law, and social inequality, ra ther than being seen as the cause that 
calls forth the principle o f  equal treatm ent as a response, com es to be seen 
as the secondary effect, an accidental result o f  essentially  fair rules.
The liberal principle o f equality o f treatment is then not a foundation principle o f 
liberal society, but rather the product o f inequality in liberal society -  inequality 
which itself is a function o f the “public-private” dichotomy. If this is so, it cannot 
be assumed that a boundary o f the kind in question can be drawn in the same way 
in all cultures. So if one is to construct a public dialogue around Goldberg’s idea 
o f “comparative contextualization”, it needs to be borne in mind that where a 
boundary is drawn is a function o f native subjectivity.
As indicated above, the way Habermas draws the distinction between private and 
public in the psyche o f the subject, subjects the “ interior” realm -  the domain o f 
relations o f free association -  to the “exterior” realm -  the domain o f normed 
public discourse. According to Ryan (1987:20) this intrusion is due to 
Habermas’s view that the labour process is part o f the “rational realities o f 
capitalism” (and thus part o f the overall project o f the rationalization o f society), 
and to the fact that a system like money has not lost its class specificity, thus 
sustaining a “self-reproducing class system” (Ryan, 1987:29). Ultimately the 
problem is due to the fact that a doctrine o f  rights is welded to an individualist 
model o f the social good in which the right to personhood grew up historically in 
conjunction with the right to property (Ryan, 1987:152). It is not difficult to see 
what the project o f modernity in its liberal pluralist form has in store for South 
Africa. Money and its concomitant social power differentiations, translated into 
political power, elevated a white intelligentsia to the status o f managers o f a 
capitalist economic system which requires labour exploitation as a necessary and 
rational feature o f its operations. Though this situation was particularly evident 
during the apartheid era, it grew up during the era o f  colonialism. It is the 
problem affirmative action policies are unsuccessfully attempting to grapple with
-  unsuccessful because, if Ryan is right -  modernity’s attempts to address the 
social problems which have developed in the wake o f differential patterns o f 
distribution tend to assimilate difference and marginalize historical identities. 
This is a source of serious social tension. What counts us valid (or fair) for black
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youths in South Africa today differs greatly from what counts as valid (or fair) for 
South Africa’s white professionals. The concerns (needs, desires) o f black 
youths are for white professionals exactly what their problems are about, and 
vice-versa. Power differences and their respective inequalities o f station make 
each interpret what counts as valid (or fair) in ways derivable from their 
respective material circumstances. Modernity’s apology for capitalism does not 
convince everybody that material inequality should be deemed morally 
acceptable.
Ryan advocates a reconceptualization o f liberalism’s principles o f liberty and 
equality. M ouffe’s “decentred se lf’, and Ryan’s “complex o f differential 
boundary relations”, tie selfhood to the external social world in such a way that a 
demarcation between “interior” and “exterior” becomes impossible. There is no 
space for a non-relational self, and by implication, no space for non-relational 
action in civic or civil society. The self, then, ceases to be an owner for whom 
rights are property. The formal right to equal treatment, for instance, becomes 
inseparable from its institutional context and the “ interrelational character of 
social wealth” (Ryan, 1987:117) and hence inseparable from material equality. 
So the doctrine of rights become a doctrine of “exercisable rights” (Ryan, 
1987:162). Two consequences of socio-psychological significance follow. The 
first is that the white professionals’ right to own large quantities o f property -  a 
right gained in a context in which white economic power diminished participation 
by blacks -  becomes the subject of social critique: in Mouffe’s (1992:236) words 
their “existing rights have been constituted on the very exclusion or subordination 
o f the rights o f other categories”, and are therefore open to radical 
reinterpretation. The second is that, to the extent black youths are able to claim 
more exercisable rights, to that extent their identity would cease to be abridged in 
comparison with their white counterparts.
What might we gain from Goldberg’s “comparative contextualization”?
There is no doubt that new identities are required (reconstitution of historical 
identities?). Mouffe favours a “common political identity” as “radical democratic 
citizens” (Mouffe, 1992:236) which centres in a reinterpretation o f the principles 
o f liberal-democratic cultures -  one which takes account o f  “the different social 
relations and subject positions in which ... [the principles o f  liberty and equality] 
are relevant: gender, class, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation etc.” (Mouffe, 
1992:236).
•  There is also no doubt that new institutional structures are required. Social 
relations in which relations o f domination prevail must be challenged if the 
principles o f liberty and equality are to be reconceptualized and their import 
rewritten. What is needed here is a conception o f “democratic equivalence” 
(Mouffe, 1992:236), a conception o f citizenship focused on a common
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identification with reinterpreted principles o f liberty and equality -  and one 
allowing the construction of a “we” (Mouffe, 1992:230) from our diversity, 
which leaves difference intact.
• There is no doubt that the political and moral force o f culture should be 
recognized and given pride o f place in the democratic culture o f  the new South 
Africa.
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